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I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following hypothetical scenario: Tim is a twenty-eight
year old drug dealer living in a suburb of Chicago. He makes his money by
selling small amounts of cannabis and other controlled substances throughout his community and the surrounding neighborhoods. At least once a
week, he must drive into the city to purchase the drugs he needs to keep his
business going. After restocking his supply, he goes through several communities selling what he can, and taking the rest back to his hometown.
While walking to the corner store the next day, he is approached by an undercover officer who solicits a small amount of cannabis. Tim agrees and is
promptly arrested for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance.
Danny is a nineteen year old from the same suburb as Tim, although
he is only home for a few days, as he is on leave from the military. His
friends have planned a surprise barbeque to welcome him back and thank
355
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him for his service. Danny celebrates with his family and friends, until a
local police officer stops by on a noise complaint made by a neighbor.
Danny answers the door and explains the situation, but the officer smells
alcohol on his breath and asks to see his identification. Danny, who is under
the age of twenty-one, receives a citation for underage consumption of alcohol.
In the following weeks, Danny receives a letter from the Illinois Secretary of State’s office informing him that he will have his license suspended.
Irate, Danny talks to an attorney about the license suspension and explains
that he did not intend to drive that night, and that he was cited in a house,
not in or near a vehicle. The attorney does a little research and is surprised
by what he finds. He discovers that the Illinois Supreme Court has recently
found suspensions, like Danny’s, to be constitutional even when no vehicle
is involved, and gives Danny the bad news that fighting the suspension may
not be worthwhile.1 On the other hand, Tim the drug dealer, who is represented by the same attorney, catches a break because in doing research on
Danny’s case, he found that an Illinois court has held that suspending the
license of someone who is arrested for delivery of a controlled substance is
unconstitutional, as long as no vehicle was involved.2
This Comment discusses how Illinois courts treat substantive due
process challenges to state statutes that require an offender’s driver’s license to be revoked or suspended when no motor vehicle is involved.3 In
Illinois, the most prominent case dealing with this issue is Illinois v. Lindner, in which the Illinois Supreme Court found that because no vehicle was
involved in the offense, license revocation could not be rationally related to
highway safety, thus making the statute unconstitutional.4 The focus of this
portion of the Comment is the misapplication of the due process analysis
that was laid out in Lindner.5 While the courts in Illinois have followed the
1.
See People v. Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (Ill. 2010) (holding that a
suspension of the minor defendant’s driving privileges did not violate due process because it
was rationally related to the state interest of safe operation of motor vehicles, even though no
motor vehicle was involved in the offense and the defendant had no intention of driving).
2.
People v. Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d 322, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the
revocation of driving privileges for the offense of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance is “an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of state powers”).
3.
See id. at 322-24.
4.
People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ill. 1989) (“Keeping off the roads
drivers who have committed offenses not involving vehicles is not a reasonable means of
ensuring that the roads are free of drivers who operate vehicles unsafely or illegally.”).
5.
Compare Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d at 323 (reversing the trial court’s decision that
held the principles found in People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829 (Ill. 1989), did not apply to
the offense of delivery of a controlled substance, and reiterating the conclusion that revoking
driving privileges for crimes that did not involve a vehicle is unreasonable), with Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1004 (finding that suspension of a minor’s driver’s license for consumption of alcohol is rationally related to safe roadways despite no vehicle being involved),
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principles developed in Lindner when dealing with adults charged with
delivery of a controlled substance, the courts have deviated from this standard in cases that involve minors consuming alcohol and possessing fake
identification.6 This Comment advocates for a more uniform application of
due process analysis, whether or not someone under the age of twenty-one
is involved. Another issue stemming from the courts’ decision to uphold
license suspension for these minors is the treatment of proportionate penalty
and double jeopardy claims.7 This Comment argues that the courts in Illinois have mishandled these types of claims, and that at least a more indepth analysis should be provided before a ruling on the merits.
Part II of this Comment begins with the basic background information
on substantive due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and double jeopardy as applied to these types of statutes. This is followed by a discussion
of how other states have dealt with statutes requiring the suspension of
driver’s licenses when no vehicle is involved in the offense. In Part III, case
law regarding these statutes in Illinois is examined for both general offenses
and offenses by people under twenty-one years of age. Part IV analyzes
how a more uniform application of due process may be attained in Illinois.
Next, in Part V, whether the state’s current license suspension procedure for
offenders under twenty-one years of age is being properly analyzed under
the proportional penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and the standards of double jeopardy are examined.8 Finally, Part VI provides a direction in which the law in Illinois should be headed.

and Freed v. Ryan, 704 N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that a license suspension for a person under twenty-one years old who uses false identification claiming to be
over twenty-one to enter a bar is related to highway safety).
6.
See Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d at 323; Horvath v. White, 832 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005).
7.
See Freed, 704 N.E.2d at 748 (demonstrating the proportionate penalty and
double jeopardy claims being brought by minors).
8.
See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No person shall be compelled in a criminal case to
give evidence against himself nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”); ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 11 (“All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of
the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.”).
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BACKGROUND

DUE PROCESS, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT

There is no doubt that in today’s society, a driver’s license is an important part of many people’s lives.9 Although driving is usually described
as a privilege and not a right, the use of either term does not have an effect
on whether it is protected under due process.10 The right or privilege to
drive is protected through both procedural and substantive due process.11
While driving is a significant right to many and has become more important
in recent times, courts do not consider it a fundamental right.12 When dealing with a non-fundamental right, the standard of review used by the judiciary is the rational basis test.13 “Under the rational basis test, a statute will be
upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.”14 There is also a presumption of constitutionality that must be overcome by the party challenging the law in
order to prevail on the claim.15 Thus, when dealing with a statute that mandates suspension of a driver’s license for an offense where no vehicle is
involved, substantive due process requires the court to determine the legislature’s interest in passing the law, find a rational relationship between the
statute and the interest, and it must not be arbitrary or discriminatory.16
These statutes that call for the suspension of driving privileges are also
frequently challenged as being cruel and unusual punishment, as well as
violating double jeopardy principles.17 Protection against cruel and unusual
9.
See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (“Once licenses are issued . . .
their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension . .
. adjudicates important interests of the licensees.”).
10.
See Max Kravitz, Ohio’s Administrative License Suspension: A Double Jeopardy and Due Process Analysis, AKRON L. REV., Winter 1996, at 138-40 (1996) (describing
how both rights and privileges can be protected under due process and that a driver’s license
is a protected interest no matter what it is labeled).
11.
Bell, 402 U.S. at 539 (describing that licenses are protected by procedural due
process); People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 831 (Ill. 1989) (describing substantive due
process protection of driver’s licenses).
12.
Lindner, 535 N.E.2d at 831 (citing Illinois v. Orth, 530 N.E.2d 210, 214 (Ill.
1988)) (“The interest in a driver’s license, while important, is not fundamental in the constitutional sense.”)
13.
Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 489 N.E.2d 1374, 1382 (Ill. 1986) (describing the rational basis test).
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
See Lindner, 535 N.E.2d at 832.
17.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Hearing Exam’rs Office, 838 P.2d 158, 177-80 (Wyo.
1992) (analyzing a state statute that required license suspension for minors convicted of
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punishment comes from the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, while double jeopardy was established in the Fifth Amendment.18
Individual states often have incorporated both of these clauses into their
own constitutions, which provide for essentially the same protections.19
Illinois has included both protections in its state constitution, although the
section referring to cruel and unusual punishment is commonly noted as the
proportionate penalties clause.20 A key determination that a court must
make before examining whether or not the law constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or double jeopardy is that the state action must be considered punishment.21 If the state action is punishment, then the analysis can
continue, but if the action is civil and remedial, then it cannot be found to
violate double jeopardy or cruel and unusual punishment.22 The relevant
application for cruel and unusual punishment to these statutes is that the
punishment of license suspension is not proportional to the crime committed.23 The United States Supreme Court has recognized several factors that
must be analyzed in order to determine whether the punishment is proportional to the criminal act.24 Double jeopardy is protection against being punished more than once for a single offense.25 These two principles will only
be relevant in Illinois as they are applied to the statutes dealing with minors

possession or consumption of alcohol and finding that it violated double jeopardy principles
as well as the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment).
18.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
19.
See, e.g., Johnson, 838 P.2d at 177-80.
20.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (defining the protections under double jeopardy); ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 11 (defining the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); See
Horvath v. White, 832 N.E.2d 366, 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (referring to the proportionate
penalties clause).
21.
See Rowe v. Dep’t of Licensing, 946 P.2d 1196, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
22.
See People v. Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d 998, 1007 (Ill. 2010) (finding that license
suspension could not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because “suspension of defendants’ driving privileges . . . is not a direct action by the government to inflict punishment.”).
23.
Johnson, 838 P.2d at 177.
24.
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 278 (1983) (stating that the factors to be considered for proportionality are “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction . . . and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”).
25.
See Johnson, 838 P.2d at 178-80. The minors were punished the first time for
violating the city ordinance, and the subsequent administrative license suspension constituted a second punishment for the same offense. Id.
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for alcohol related offenses, given that the drug and sex offense statutes
have been held unconstitutional on due process grounds.26
B.

DUE PROCESS APPLIED TO ADULT OFFENDERS OUTSIDE OF ILLINOIS

The most common way that states have found statutes requiring revocation or suspension of a driver’s license for offenses not involving vehicles
to be constitutional on due process grounds is when the offense is drug related.27 There are currently ten states with decisions reflecting this position.28 Among these states, the offense at issue is most often possession of a
controlled substance or a substantially similar violation.29 All of these state
courts apply a similar due process analysis to the one previously mentioned—they determine the legitimate state interest and then find a rational
relationship between this interest and the statute.30
Each of the courts began by finding a legitimate state interest in either
deterring criminal acts or in punishing those who violated the statute.31 The
courts had no trouble in the second step of the due process analysis of determining whether there was rational relationship between punishing and
deterring offenders with suspension of their licenses.32 Four of the states
also found that these statutes implicated the legitimate state interest of
26.
See People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ill. 1989) (finding the statute unconstitutional as applied to the class of sex offenders); People v. Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d 322,
323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding the statute unconstitutional as applied to persons convicted
of delivery of a controlled substance); Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1007 (determining
whether the statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment after determining suspension
did not violate minor’s rights to due process).
27.
See Jeffrey T. Walter, Annotation, Validity and Application of Statute or Regulation Authorizing Revocation or Suspension of Driver’s License for Reason Unrelated to
use of, or Ability to Operate, Motor Vehicle, 18 A.L.R. (5th) § 2(a), at 542 (1994).
28.
See Illinois v. Zinn, 843 P.2d 1351, 1354-55 (Colo. 1993); Lite v. State, 617 So.
2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. 1993); Quiller v. Bowman, 425 S.E.2d 641, 643 (Ga. 1993); Mitchell v.
State, 659 N.E.2d 112, 115-16 (Ind. 1995); State v. Bell, 572 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Iowa 1997);
Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Mass. 1992); State v. Fonseca, 665 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ohio 1995); Plowman v. Commonwealth, 635 A.2d 124, 127
(Pa. 1993); Walton v. Commonwealth, 485 S.E.2d 641, 642-43 (Va. 1997); State v. Wolfe,
No. 94-2663-CR, 1995 WL 228329, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1995).
29.
See, e.g., Quiller, 425 S.E.2d at 642 (holding that defendant had violated the
Georgia Controlled Substances Act for possession of a controlled substance).
30.
See, e.g., Lite, 617 So. 2d at 1059-60 (describing the rational basis test to be
applied in analyzing the due process protections of a non-fundamental right).
31.
E.g., Mitchell, 659 N.E.2d at 116 (determining the legislature’s intended interest, the court stated there was a “legitimate state interest in punishing lawbreakers and deterring lawbreaking”).
32.
See id. (finding a rational relationship). The court simply states that the “statute
only applies to those that have been convicted of one of the enumerated offenses,” thus
showing a relation to punishment and deterrence. Id.
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highway safety.33 These courts found a rational relationship despite the fact
that no vehicle was involved, because “the legislature could reasonably
assume that a person who possesses illegal substances would use those substances and could operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of said
substances.”34 Thus, the relationship between the statute and the interest
does not have to necessarily be direct, but merely rationally related.35 Only
two of these ten state decisions dealt with the final step of the due process
analysis of whether or not the law is arbitrary or discriminatory.36 Both of
these courts came to the same conclusion that the laws were not arbitrary,
but did so in different ways.37 In Lite v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida
found that “Florida law does not require that there be a direct relationship
between the type of punishment and the offense itself.”38 While in Plowman
v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the
law is not arbitrary if there are identifiable benefits created by the legislation, and several benefits were discovered by the court.39 In summary, the
states that allow for license suspension or revocation for drug related offenses when no vehicle is involved have had no problem in finding that the
legitimate state interests of punishment, deterrence, and highway safety are
rationally related to these statutes, and generally are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory.40
C.

DUE PROCESS, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT APPLIED TO MINOR OFFENDERS OUTSIDE OF ILLINOIS

A number of states have statutes in place which suspend or revoke the
driver’s licenses of persons under twenty-one years of age or eighteen years
33.
See Quiller, 425 S.E.2d at 643; Rushworth, 596 N.E.2d at 344; Walton, 485
S.E.2d at 643; State v. Wolfe, No. 94-2663-CR, 1995 WL 228329, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr.
19, 1995).
34.
Walton, 485 S.E.2d at 643.
35.
See id. There is no direct relationship between the offense and driving, but it is
rational that someone who possesses drugs may use them, and then while under the influence may drive which effects highway safety. Id.
36.
See Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. 1993); Plowman v. Commonwealth, 635 A.2d 124, 127 (Pa. 1993).
37.
See Lite, 617 So. 2d at 1060; Plowman, 635 A.2d at 127.
38.
Lite, 617 So. 2d at 1060.
39.
Plowman, 635 A.2d at 127. The court notes that the punishment for first time
drug offenders is likely only a small fine, and that license suspension could act as a deterrent
to drug use because would be offenders will think about the consequence of losing their
license. Id. This deterrent effect is enough of a potential benefit for the court to conclude that
this legislation is not arbitrary. Id.
40.
See Walton, 485 S.E.2d at 642-43 (noting the legislature’s interests of punishment, deterrence, and highway safety); Lite, 617 So. 2d at 1060 (concluding that the statute
is not an arbitrary measure created by the legislature).
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of age for offenses not involving a vehicle.41 These statutes primarily involve alcohol or the use of false identification in an attempt to obtain alcohol, and similar to the statutes previously discussed that involved adults, the
use or possession of controlled substances.42 In applying the substantive due
process analysis to these statutes, punishment and deterrence were often
cited as the state interest that the legislatures were trying to promote.43
Along with punishment and deterrence, highway safety was another legitimate interest found by courts to be engaged by this type of legislation.44 In
finding the same legitimate state interests that were implicated by the statutes dealing with adult offenses, courts again used the same logic to conclude that the laws dealing with minors were also rationally related.45 Thus,
41.

Id.

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 171.171 (2010). The statute states:
The commissioner shall suspend for a period of 90 days the license of a
person who:
(1) is under the age of 21 years and is convicted of purchasing or attempting to purchase an alcoholic beverage in violation of section
340A.503 if the person used a license, Minnesota identification card, or
any type of false identification to purchase or attempt to purchase the
alcoholic beverage.

42.
E.g., MINN. STAT. § 171.171 (2010) (describing offenses including attempting
to purchase alcohol with false identification while being under twenty-one years of age, as
well as attempting to buy tobacco with false identification while being under eighteen years
of age); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1502 (d)(1) (2010) (listing offenses including suspension for
offenses of possession, consumption, procurement, or attempted procurement of alcohol for
persons under twenty-one years of age); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.265 (2010) (listing offenses including suspension for juveniles for offenses involving alcohol, controlled substances, and firearms).
43.
In re Maricopa, Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JV-114428, 770 P.2d 394, 397 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1989) (“[D]enying a juvenile his or her means of transportation would serve to
deter juvenile drug abuse . . . .”); State v. Bennett, 125 P.3d 522, 527-28 (Idaho 2005) (“The
legislature could elect this form of punishment in the belief that it would deter underage
drinking . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Strunk, 582 A.2d 1326, 1329 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(“[B]oth deterrence and punishment represent legitimate state interests . . . .”).
44.
State v. Neidermeyer, 14 P.3d 264, 268 (Alaska 2000) (explaining the legislatures interest, the court notes, “a chain of rational inferences can be forged to link underage
drinking to dangerous driving”); Illinois v. Valenzuela, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 494 (Cal. App.
Dep’t Super. Ct. 1991) (“[T]he Legislature’s intent to reduce the incidence of injuries and
deaths occurring as a result of automobile accidents caused by minors under the influence of
alcohol or illegal drugs.”); Bennett, 125 P.3d at 528 (“potentially act as a deterrent to unlawful drinking and driving”).
45.
See Strunk, 582 A.2d at 1330 (finding that minors place a high value on their
driver’s license and that license suspension will act as better deterrent than a fine). This
reasoning is very similar to the thinking in Plowman v. Commonwealth, 635 A.2d 124, 127
(Pa. 1993), where the court determined that license suspension would serve as a better deterrent than a small fine to first time drug offenders. See also Neidermeyer, 14 P.3d at 268
(finding a rational relationship the court notes there is no need for a direct relationship,
“[t]hough this inferential nexus may be tenuous, it is nonetheless rational.”). This logic is
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the majority of courts have found there are several legitimate state interests
that are logically related to license suspension for minors convicted of alcohol and drug related offenses, and that the minors could not overcome “the
heavy burden of proving that the legislature acted irrationally . . . .”46
Although the majority of courts agree that these statutes do not violate
a minor’s due process rights, less consistency exists throughout the United
States when dealing with double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment for these crimes.47 The first issue that must be addressed in applying
these two principles is “whether suspension of the defendants’ driving
privileges is a direct action by the government to inflict punishment[,]” and
this is where the courts begin to divide.48 Courts in Alaska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming have held that license suspension is considered
punishment, while California has held that license suspension is remedial
and civil.49 The three courts that went on to decide whether these statutes
violated the constitutional standards split on the issue, with Pennsylvania
and Oregon holding that that it was not cruel and unusual punishment,
while Wyoming held that it violated double jeopardy, as well as cruel and
unusual punishment.50 To reiterate, states that have statutes requiring sussimilar to that in Walton v. Commonwealth, where the court found that a vehicle does not
have to be involved in the offense for there to be a rational relationship to highway safety.
Walton, 485 S.E.2d at 643.
46.
See, e.g., Neidermeyer, 14 P.3d at 267.
47.
See Strunk, 582 A.2d at 1330-33 (holding that the punishment of license suspension is not grossly disproportionate to the offense of underage consumption or possession of
alcohol); Valenzuela, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d at 493 (finding that license suspension is remedial not
penal and therefore cannot be regarded as cruel and unusual punishment); Johnson v. Hearing Exam’r Office, 838 P.2d 158,177-80 (Wyo. 1992) (holding that license suspension for
underage possession or consumption of alcohol violated both double jeopardy and cruel and
unusual punishment).
48.
People v. Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d 998, 1007 (Ill. 2010).
49.
Compare Neidermeyer, 14 P.3d at 272 (“AS 28.15.183 must be viewed as imposing a criminal penalty.”), and State v. Day, 733 P.2d 937, 939 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (failing to explicitly state that the statute is punitive, the court moves to the next step of the
analysis which implies the punitive nature), and Strunk, 582 A.2d at 1330-33 (failing to
explicitly state that the statute is punitive the court moves to the next step of the analysis
which implies the punitive nature), and Johnson, 838 P.2d at 179 (“It was certainly not intended to be remedial.”), with Valenzuela, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493 (“[S]uspension . . . is not
penal in nature. It is a remedial measure designed to ensure public safety on the streets and
highways.” (citing Beamon v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 4 Cal. Rptr. 396, 403 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960))).
50.
Compare Day, 733 P.2d at 939 (“[L]oss of driving privileges for conviction of
minor in possession is not a disproportionate penalty when compared to the loss of liberty
that can be imposed for other offenses.”), and Strunk, 582 A.2d at 1332 (“[A] 90-day
driver’s license suspension is not an excessive penalty.”), with Johnson, 838 P.2d at 177-80
(holding that license suspension does not meet the required proportionality between offense
and punishment to make it constitutional, and that the suspension was also second punishment in violation of double jeopardy principles).
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pension of minors’ driver’s licenses for offenses not involving a vehicle
have generally held those laws to overcome substantive due process challenges, but there is no consensus among the states on whether license suspension or revocation violates double jeopardy or constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.51
III.
A.

ILLINOIS CASE LAW

STATUTES APPLYING TO ADULT SEX AND DRUG OFFENSES

The Supreme Court of Illinois first reviewed a substantive due process
challenge to a statute requiring driver’s license revocation for an offense
that did not involve a vehicle in Illinois v. Lindner.52 This case involved a
defendant who had been charged with multiple counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and criminal sexual assault.53 An Illinois statute required
license revocation upon conviction of a number of sex and drug related
offenses, including the abovementioned offenses of which the defendant
was convicted.54 The trial court found this statute unconstitutional because
it deprived the defendant of due process of law to which the state took issue
and chose to appeal.55 On direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the
court began by stating that the standard of review would be the rational
basis test, as there was no fundamental right involved, and that the main
disagreement between the parties was the legitimate state interest implicated by the statute.56 The court then looked to the intent of the legislature
through the text of the surrounding code sections and determined that “the
public interest is the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehi-

51.
See, e.g., Strunk, 582 A.2d at 1329-33 (affirming that license suspension did not
violate substantive due process, and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
52.
See People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 830 (Ill. 1989).
53.
Id.
54.
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 95 1/2, ¶ 6-205(b)(2) (1987). The statute states:
(b)The Secretary of state shall also forthwith revoke the license or permit of any driver in the following situations: . . . 2. Of any driver, upon
receiving notice from the clerk of the court of the
conviction of such driver for the commission of any of the following sex
offenses: criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault,
criminal sexual abuse, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, juvenile pimping, soliciting for a juvenile prostitute and the manufacture, sale or delivery of controlled substances or instruments used for illegal drug use or
abuse.
Id.
55.
See Lindner, 535 N.E.2d at 830.
56.
Id. at 831-32.
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cles.”57 The court’s next step in the due process analysis was to find
whether this statute was rationally related to the state interest that had been
identified.58 The court found that “[b]ecause a vehicle was not involved in
any way in the commission of the offenses for which defendant was convicted, the revocation of his license bears no relationship, much less a reasonable one, to the public interest we have identified.”59 In the final phase
of the due process analysis, the court concluded that the law was arbitrary
in that there was no reason for the legislature to impose license revocation
for these offenses, and not impose the same penalty for numerous other
crimes that did not involve motor vehicles.60 Thus, the statute was held unconstitutional because there was no rational relationship found between the
law and the state interest of highway safety, and choosing certain offenses
that did not involve vehicles, while not including others “is an unreasonable
and arbitrary exercise of the State’s police power.”61
Although the court had already found the statute unconstitutional, it
entertained the State’s argument that the legislature’s purpose in passing the
statute could have been punishment for this class of offenders.62 The court
stated, for the sake of argument, that it would consider license revocation a
punishment, despite prior decisions holding that it was a civil measure.63
This argument was not found to be persuasive by the court as it found that
revocation would be an “additional penalty for a criminal offense” that still
lacked a rational relationship, and was no less arbitrary.64
A dissenting opinion was written by Justice Miller, in which he found
the majority’s view of the purported legislative interest to be too narrow.65
Justice Miller specifically noted that the code section relied upon by the
majority as the legislature’s supposed interest was in place long before the
57.
Id. at 833 (“[T]he interest in keeping the roads free of two kinds of drivers:
those who threaten the safety of others and those who have abused the privilege to drive by
doing so illegally . . . or by using a vehicle to commit a criminal act.”).
58.
Id.
59.
Lindner, 535 N.E.2d at 833.
60.
Id. (“[T]he means chosen are arbitrary, not only because the offenses specified
in section 6-205(b)(2) have no connection to motor vehicles, but also because the inclusion
of those offenses and no others is arbitrary.”).
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. (“[W]e will assume arguendo that revocation after conviction constitutes
punishment, notwithstanding our decisions which have held that summary suspension of a
license before a trial on the merits is an administrative function and not a punishment.”
(citing People v. Esposito, 521 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ill. 1988))).
64.
Lindner, 535 N.E.2d at 834 (explaining the statutes arbitrary nature, “[i]f the
legislature may punish these offenses with revocation, nothing prohibits it from imposing
that penalty for violating any provision of the Criminal Code, and that would plainly be
irrational”).
65.
Id. at 835 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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section requiring revocation of sex offender’s driver’s licenses was codified.66 The lone dissent by Justice Miller also argued that the legislature had
an interest in reducing the mobility of certain offenders, because doing so
could decrease opportunities to find victims and take away a means of
evading police.67 For these reasons, Justice Miller would have upheld the
statute requiring license revocation.68
In Illinois v. Lawrence, an Illinois appellate court reaffirmed that the
Lindner decision did not just apply to sex offenses, it applied to all of the
sex and drug offenses listed in the particular code section.69 In Lawrence,
the defendant pled guilty to multiple counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, and following his prison sentence, his license was revoked.70 After his release from prison, the defendant was arrested for driving with a revoked license, which caused his probation stemming from his
prior conviction to also be revoked.71 The defendant’s argument in the trial
court that license revocation was improper based on Lindner was not persuasive, as the court found that Lindner only applied to sex offenses listed
in the statute.72 The appellate court reversed, finding that although revocation for this offense could be rationally related to the legitimate state interest in deterring crime, “[t]he choice of this offense and no others remains an
arbitrary decision of the legislature.”73 Thus, the appellate court held that
Lindner called for the entire code section to be overruled, therefore neither
the defendant’s license revocation was proper, nor was his probation revocation based on the improper arrest for driving with a revoked license.74
B.

STATUTES APPLYING TO MINOR ALCOHOL RELATED OFFENSES

The first Illinois case that dealt with license suspension for persons
under twenty-one years old when no vehicle was involved was Freed v.
Ryan.75 In this case a nineteen year old Northern Illinois University student
tried to use the state identification card of a twenty-four year old to enter a
66.
Id. at 836 (Miller, J., dissenting) (“[T]he statement of purpose now found in
section 6-204(a) predates the enactment of the statute at issue here.”).
67.
Id. (Miller, J., dissenting).
68.
Id. at 837 (Miller, J., dissenting).
69.
People v. Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d 322, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“Lindner overruled section 6-205(b)(2) in its entirety without regard for the specific offense as an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of state powers.”).
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d at 323. The defendant’s arrest was improper since license
revocation as part of the initial sentence was found to be unconstitutional. Id. Therefore, the
defendant was re-released on probation. Id.
75.
Freed v. Ryan, 704 N.E.2d 746, 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
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bar and, upon being refused admittance, a nearby police officer cited the
student for violating a city ordinance that forbade minors from using false
identification to obtain alcohol.76 The punishment provision of the ordinance called for a small fine as well as court supervision, but the police
department also forwarded a report of the incident to the Illinois Secretary
of State who then informed the minor that his license would be suspended
pursuant to the Illinois Vehicle Code.77 The plaintiff contested the suspension on substantive due process grounds and argued that the suspension
violated double jeopardy.78 The trial court upheld the license suspension,
and the plaintiff appealed.79
The appellate court began the due process analysis by determining that
the public interest was the same as found in Lindner of “the safe and legal
operation and ownership of motor vehicles.”80 Moving onto the next step of
the analysis, the court found license suspension to be rationally related to
this legitimate interest based on the premise that “the legislature could rationally speculate that license holders under twenty-one years old may use
false identification in an attempt to gain access to alcohol and that such
conduct would lead on balance to an increase in drunken driving.”81 To
distinguish this case from Lindner, the court mentioned that the crimes being deterred were “directly related” to highway safety, while in Lindner
there was no such direct relationship found.82 In conclusion, the court found
there was no violation of due process because the legitimate interest of
highway safety was rationally related to suspending the licenses of persons
under twenty-one who obtain alcohol through the use of false identification.
Because they could drive after drinking alcohol, and driving while intoxicated is directly related to highway safety, there was therefore no violation
of due process.83
The appellate court quickly rejected the plaintiff’s claims that the statute violated double jeopardy and the proportional penalty clause of the Illi76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.; 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-206 (1994) states:
(a) The Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or revoke the driving
privileges of any person
without preliminary hearing upon a showing of the person’s records or
other sufficient
evidence that the person . . . (10) Has possessed, displayed, or attempted
to fraudulently use any
license, identification card, or permit not issued to the person.
Freed, 704 N.E.2d at 747.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id.
See Freed, 704 N.E.2d at 749-50.

368

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

nois Constitution, because of the holding in Lindner “that summary suspension of driving privileges before a trial on the merits is not punishment.”84
As previously noted, if license suspension is not considered a punishment,
then it fails to meet a required element of both double jeopardy and the proportional penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.85
The next case in Illinois that dealt with this issue is Horvath v. White.86
This case was similar to Freed v. Ryan in that a nineteen-year-old college
student who possessed false identification was arrested for an alcohol related offense with no vehicle involved, and subsequently brought an action
claiming that suspension of his license violated both due process and the
proportional penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.87 The plaintiff’s
constitutional challenges to the statute were rejected at both an initial administrative hearing, as well as in the trial court.88
On appeal, the court cited the state interest found in Freed v. Ryan of
maintaining safe roadways.89 It then recited the holding in Freed v. Ryan
that license suspension for this offense is rationally related to highway
safety because it keeps intoxicated minors from off of state roadways.90 The
court then further discussed the issues of the case in an attempt to distinguish this situation from the findings in Lindner and Lawrence where license suspension for certain sex and drug offenses not involving motor
vehicles were found to violate due process.91 The court reasoned that unlike
the crimes in Lindner and Lawrence, there is a direct relationship between
minors using false identification and highway safety, therefore the law does
not offend due process of the law.92 The court assumed that minors who
possess false identification will use this to obtain alcohol, and subsequently

84.
Id. at 748 (citing People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ill. 1989)).
85.
Id.
86.
See Horvath v. White, 832 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
87.
Compare Freed, 704 N.E.2d at 747 (describing the facts of the case and the
causes of action), with Horvath, 832 N.E.2d at 369 (describing a similar situation involving a
minor and the use of false identification relating to alcohol along with the minor’s subsequent due process and proportional penalties claims).
88.
Horvath, 832 N.E.2d at 369-70.
89.
Id. at 371 (“The primary public interest intended to be protected by the Code is
the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles.”) (citing Freed, 704 N.E.2d at
749)).
90.
Id. at 372 (“The statutory provision here that permits suspension of driving
privileges is a legitimate means to deter and remove dangerous drivers from the highway and
is, therefore, not irrational.” (citing Freed, 704 N.E.2d at 749)).
91.
Id. at 373.
92.
Horvath, 832 N.E.2d at 373 (“In contrast, the behavior the State seeks to deter
here is directly related to the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles; specifically, prohibiting underage individuals from acquiring and consuming alcohol and driving while intoxicated.”).
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these minors will drive while under the influence of alcohol.93 Although the
court also mentioned how in Lawrence that license suspension for the particular offense and not others was found to be an arbitrary decision by the
legislature, the court failed to elaborate on how that holding could affect the
case at hand.94 Citing Freed v. Ryan, the court swiftly rejected the minor’s
proportional penalty clause argument based on prior holdings that found
administrative license suspension was not considered punishment.95
In the most recent decision in this line of cases, the Illinois Supreme
Court reviewed the constitutionality of license suspension for the offense of
consumption of alcohol by a minor.96 In Illinois v. Boeckmann, the defendants were cited for underage consumption of alcohol, and subsequently
challenged the suspension of their licenses on due process and proportional
penalty grounds.97 At the trial level, the court found the code sections
authorizing license suspension to be unconstitutional based on the precedent set out in Lindner, and subsequently the Illinois Secretary of State appealed the decision directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.98
In following the doctrine of stare decisis, the Illinois Supreme Court
identified the same legitimate state interest of highway safety as identified
in the Lindner decision.99 Next, the court looked to determine if there was
rational relationship between the offense and the identified state interest.100
In finding a relationship, the court noted, “[p]reventing young people from
driving after consuming alcohol unquestionably furthers the public interest .
. . .”101 The court’s analysis did not find a direct relationship between the
offense and the public interest, but rather a series of rational inferences the
legislature could have drawn to show a correlation.102 The court then looked

93.
See id.
94.
See id. at 373-74.
95.
Id. at 375.
96.
People v. Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d 998, 998-99 (Ill. 2010).
97.
Id. at 1000-01.
98.
Id. at 1000 (“The circuit court of Clinton County declared unconstitutional
section 6-206(a)(43) of the Illinois Vehicle Code . . . .”).
99.
Id. at 1002 (“[T]he challenged provisions were intended to protect the public
interest in ‘the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles.’” (quoting Illinois
v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ill. 1989))).
100.
Id.
101.
Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1003.
102.
Id. The court stated:
[T]he General Assembly may have believed that a young person who
has a driver’s license and consumes alcohol illegally may take the additional step of driving after consuming alcohol. It is reasonable to believe
a young person disobeying the law against underage consumption of alcohol may also lack the judgment to decline to drive after drinking.
Id.
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to distinguish this case from the holdings found in Lindner.103 To do so, the
court discussed how Lindner does not stand for the narrow proposition that
if no vehicle is involved, then a summary license suspension violates due
process.104 Instead, the court stated that Lindner created the broader analysis
of “whether the revocation of driving privileges bears a rational relationship
to the public interest.”105 To apply this analysis, the court stated that the sex
offense in Lindner had no impact on the defendant’s ability to drive, but
consumption of alcohol would impact the minor’s driving ability, thus a
rational relationship to highway safety is established.106 In conclusion, the
court found that although the defendants had no intention of driving, there
is still a rational relationship between license suspension for the offense of
consumption of alcohol by a minor with the state interest of highway
safety.107
In response to the defendants’ proportional penalty argument the court
began by stating that the initial determination to invoke this clause was
whether license suspension can be considered punishment.108 The court
then stated that it had previously held summary license suspension not to be
considered punishment because the goal is to promote highway safety.109
Therefore, with the purpose of summary license suspension being remedial,
it could not be found to violate the proportional penalties clause, as it only
applies to criminal punishment.110 The opinion written by Justice Kilbride
was only joined by Justice Fitzgerald.111
Justice Garman authored a special concurrence, which was joined by
Justice Thomas.112 In coming to the same conclusion on the constitutionality of the statute as Justice Kilbride, the concurring justices disagreed with
the identified state interest.113 The concurrence went on to state that “Lindner should be overruled to the extent that it so narrowly defines the public
purpose . . . [,]” and that the trial court’s decision should be upheld if the
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1003.
107.
Id. at 1004.
108.
Id. at 1007 (“The critical determination, therefore, is whether suspension of the
defendants’ driving privileges is a direct action by the government to inflict punishment.”).
109.
Id. (“[W]e have previously stated statutory summary suspension of a driver’s
license is not penal in nature because it is intended to protect the public rather than punish a
licensee.” (citing People v. Esposito, 521 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ill. 1998))).
110.
Id.
111.
Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1007.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 1008 (Garman, J., concurring) (“In my opinion, Lindner defined the public
purpose . . . too narrowly and failed to recognize that different public purposes might be
served by different statutory provisions . . . .”)
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legitimate state interest found in Lindner were to be used.114 The concurring
justices then went on to criticize the far-reaching attempt by the lead opinion to logically connect underage drinking with the highway safety, stating
that “the lead opinion has saved Lindner by rendering it meaningless.”115
Finally, the concurrence explained a broader analysis in finding the public
interest, noting it does not have to be explicitly stated by the legislature.116
The opinion concludes with the idea that the legislature’s interest may have
been to encourage compliance of liquor laws by minors, and that the statute
is constitutional on these grounds.117
Justice Freeman was joined by Justice Burke in dissent.118 The dissenting justices agreed with the concurrence authored by Justice Garman, in the
idea that the lead opinion “renders Lindner meaningless.”119 Although,
since Lindner being overruled was not argued in this case, the dissenting
justices would have followed the precedent laid out in Lindner and found
the statute to be a violation of the minors’ right to due process.120
IV.
A.

A MORE UNIFORM DUE PROCESS APPLICATION IN ILLINOIS

THE IDEAL RESOLUTION FOLLOWING BOECKMANN

Currently in Illinois, courts’ interpretations of substantive due process
do not allow a person that is convicted of delivery of a controlled substance
to lose his license as punishment for this crime as long as a vehicle was not
involved in the commission.121 On the other hand, courts have held that due
process allows license suspension for a minor in possession of false identification or who consumes alcohol, even if no vehicle was involved in the
114.
Id. at 1009, 1011 (Garman, J., concurring) (“The trial court, however, properly
applied Lindner and found that very narrow purpose . . . was not met.”).
115.
Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1011. Justice Garman expands from the rationale
stated in the lead opinions:
[T]he lead opinion concludes that because an individual may commit
one crime, he may lack the judgment to decline to commit another
crime. Under this reasoning, the legislature could provide that a conviction of domestic battery is grounds for the suspension of the offender’s
driver’s license because his anger issues make him likely to succumb to
road rage . . . .
Id.
116.
Id. at 1012 (Garman, J., concurring) (“It is entirely appropriate for the court to
consider what purpose the legislature might have intended to serve.”))
117.
Id. at 1014-15 (Garman, J., concurring).
118.
Id. at 1015-16 (Garman, J., concurring).
119.
Id. at 1015.
120.
Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1016.
121.
People v. Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d 322, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the
defendant who was guilty of delivery of a controlled substance could not have his license
revoked as this would violate due process rights under the precedent found in Lindner).
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crime.122 The ideal resolution to this contradictory state of the law in Illinois
is for the courts to find that due process allows license suspension for these
controlled substance violators along with the minor offenders.123 There are
several reasons why the position that Illinois courts have taken in these controlled substance cases should be reversed.124 First, the decision in Lawrence was based on an interpretation of Lindner that has subsequently been
found obsolete by the Illinois Supreme Court.125 In Lawrence, the Fifth
District Appellate Court relied on the proposition found in Lindner that if
no vehicle is involved in the offense then the statute could not rationally be
related to the state interest of maintaining safe roadways.126 More recently,
in Boeckmann, the two justices who formed the lead opinion held that
Lindner stood for a broader analysis than “simply determining whether a
vehicle was involved in the offense.”127 While concurring in the result, two
different justices came to the conclusion that the court in Lindner had misidentified the state interest implicated by the legislature.128 Both the lead
opinion and the concurrence found that the statute had violated the due
process clause through a different means of analysis,129 and either analysis
applied to the issue in Lawrence would necessitate a holding that the law is
constitutional.
The justices in the lead opinion began their due process analysis by
identifying the state interest of highway safety, and related it to license suspension for minors who consumed alcohol through a series of logically
associated conclusions that the legislature could have construed.130 If the
122.
See Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1007 (holding that a statute requiring license
suspension for minors cited for consumption of alcohol by a minor does not offended due
process even if no vehicle was involved in the offense); Horvath v. White, 832 N.E.2d 366,
373-74 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that a statute requiring license suspension for minors
cited for possessing false identification did not violate due process).
123.
See infra Part IV.A (developing the arguments on why the Lawrence decision
should be reversed).
124.
See Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1011 (explaining how the interpretation of the
holding in Lindner has changed); see also supra Part II.B. (describing how a number of
states have found license suspension for controlled substance offenders does not to violate
due process rights when no vehicle was involved in the offense).
125.
See Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1003. The lead opinion held that “the rationale
in Lindner is broader than simply determining whether a vehicle was involved in the offense.” Id. While the concurring opinion held that the public interest in Lindner was not
identified properly. Id. at 1008 (Garman, J., concurring).
126.
Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d at 323 (“To prohibit persons from driving merely because they have committed an offense which did not even involve the use of a motor vehicle
is not a reasonable way to ensure that motor vehicles will be owned and operated safely and
legally.”) (citing People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ill. 1989))).
127.
Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1003.
128.
Id. at 1008-10 (Garman, J., concurring).
129.
See id. at 1003-10.
130.
Id. at 1003. The court stated:
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court concluded that a person under twenty-one who broke the law by consuming alcohol may also break the law by driving under the influence in the
future, and this creates a rational relation to highway safety, then the court
should conclude that a person unlawfully delivering a controlled substance
may also drive under the influence in the future, which similarly relates to
highway safety.131 Similarly, a court could hold that a person who broke the
law by delivering a controlled substance, has provided a means for the receiver of those substances to possibly drive while under the influence of
drugs, which also forms a logical connection to highway safety. These
analogies show one route the courts could take in reversing their position on
license suspension for the offense of delivery of a controlled substance,
based on the lead opinion in the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in
Boeckmann.132
The statute in Lawrence may also be found constitutional under the
analysis developed by the concurring justices in Boeckmann.133 The concurring opinion emphasizes that the court in Lindner too narrowly defined the
state interest of highway safety, and asserts that the legislature could have
had different objectives in mind when codifying the legislation.134 Justice
Garman states that Lindner was misguided as the court focused on “the
public interest” instead of “a legitimate interest,” further explaining that
there does not have to be a pinpointed interest and that the court could uphold the law on a hypothetical legitimate state interest under the rational
basis test, if the court so chooses.135 To close, the concurrence found the
statute constitutional based on a rational relationship between the punishment of license suspension and the state interest of encouraging minors to
comply with the Liquor Control Act.136 Applying this rationale to Lawrence, the state interest of “repressing the commission of such crimes,”
which was rejected by the appellate court in Lawrence, could provide a

Id.

[T]he General Assembly may have believed that a young person who
has a driver’s license and consumes alcohol illegally may take the additional step of driving after consuming alcohol. It is reasonable to believe
a young person disobeying the law against underage consumption of alcohol may also lack the judgment to decline to drive after drinking.

131.
See id. (describing the rational relationship between license suspension and
highway safety).
132.
See Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1003.
133.
See id. at 1012-15 (Garman, J., concurring).
134.
Id. at 1008 (Garman, J., concurring) (“[D]ifferent public purposes might be
served by different statutory provisions that mandate or permit the revocation or suspension
of a driver’s license.”).
135.
Id. at 1011-13 (Garman, J., concurring).
136.
Id. at 1015 (Garman, J., concurring).
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basis for a finding of the law’s constitutionality.137 The legislature could
have reasonably thought that reducing these offenders’ transportation options may limit their ability to further commit crimes of this nature.138 The
concurring opinion further shows that the decision in Lawrence was based
on an archaic interpretation of Lindner, and now needs to be brought in line
with the more recent Illinois Supreme Court holding in Boeckmann.139
The court in Lawrence held that the statute violated due process not
only because of the lack of a relationship between the state interest and
license suspension, but because the choice of suspension for “this offense
and no others remains an arbitrary decision of the legislature.”140 This
statement by the court is questionable not only because this offense was in a
code section that listed seven separate offenses that would call for license
suspension,141 but there is precedent holding similar types of actions by the
legislature to be constitutional.142 In Williamson v. Lee Optical, the United
States Supreme Court, while reviewing a statute under due process, stated
“the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be
constitutional;” and continued, “[i]t is enough that there is an evil at hand
for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it.”143 Through passing the legislation
that required license revocation for these offenses, the Illinois Legislature
took one step to resolve a problem by increasing punishment, and this process of taking one rational step at a time to correct the problem is by no
means a violation of due process.144 This issue, if not a violation of due
137.
See People v. Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d 322, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
138.
See supra Part I (introducing Tim the hypothetical drug dealer, an example of
the type of offender whose illegal activities would be substantially burdened by the loss of
his license).
139.
See Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1003-15 (explaining how the Lindner decision
should be interpreted when dealing with statutes of this kind).
140.
Lawrence, 565 N.E.2d at 323.
141.
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 95 1/2, ¶ 6-205(b)(2) (1987) states:
(b) The Secretary of State shall also forthwith revoke the license or permit of any driver in the following situations: . . .
2. Of any driver, upon receiving notice from the clerk of the court of the
conviction of such driver for the commission of any of the following sex
offenses: criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault,
criminal sexual abuse, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, juvenile pimping, soliciting for a juvenile prostitute and the manufacture, sale or delivery of controlled substances or instruments used for illegal drug use or
abuse.
Id.
142.
See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
143.
Id.
144.
See id. at 489 (“[T]he reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the
phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”) (citing Semler v.
State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935))).
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process, should be remedied by the voters as a form of legislative oversight,
as it has long been held that “[f]or protection against abuses by the legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.”145 Overall, this
decision by the legislature to single out not one, but a group of seven offenses, was one step in protecting the public from a group of dangerous sex
and drug offenders which is well within the constitutional limits of due
process.146
The argument that the decision in Lawrence should be reversed is substantially furthered by the persuasive authority laid out in other state court
decisions throughout the country dealing with this issue.147 These cases
bolster both the lead and concurring opinions in the Boeckmann decision
which is the current state of the law in Illinois with regards to the issue of
license suspension for crimes not involving a motor vehicle.148 The authority from all ten of the states other than Illinois came to the same conclusion
as the concurring opinion in Boeckmann, that an interest in either deterrence
or punishment could have been implicated by legislature in passing this
type of statute, and this variety of legislation is rationally related to achieving these purposes.149 Four of the ten states also agree with the rationale in
the lead opinion of Boeckmann that highway safety could have been the
interest of the legislature, and that the relationship is not directly found, but
rather is developed through a series of logical steps.150
Illinois courts should reverse their position on the issue of whether license revocation for controlled substance offenders violates substantive due
process.151 This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Lawrence decision is based on precedent that has been interpreted differently by the Illinois Supreme Court in recent years, that labeling the statute in Lawrence as
arbitrary was misguided as shown by Williamson v. Lee Optical, and that
the persuasive authority from jurisdictions around the country collectively
agree that license suspension for controlled substance offenders where no
vehicle is involved does not violate substantive due process.152
145.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
146.
See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-89.
147.
See cases cited supra note 25 (listing ten other states that have found similar
statutes not to violate due process).
148.
See cases cited supra notes 28 & 30; see also People v. Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d
998, 1006-15 (Ill. 2010).
149.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
150.
Compare supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (describing how the legislature could infer that someone who possessed a controlled substance could then possibly
drive while under the influence of such substance), with Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1003
(noting how the legislature could assume that a minor who is under the influence of alcohol
and in possession of a driver’s license may then drive while under the influence of alcohol).
151.
See supra Part IV.A.
152.
See supra Part IV.A.
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THE ALTERNATIVE LINDNER BASED RESOLUTION

Although the best option would be for the courts in Illinois to uphold
license suspension for minors who abuse alcohol related laws and expand
this punishment to the controlled substance offenders described in Lawrence,153 if the courts refuse to expand license suspension to controlled substance offenders, it should also be repealed as a punishment for these minors. The concurring and dissenting justices in the Boeckmann decision
persuasively argue that there is no good way to distinguish the issue in Boeckmann from the issue previously ruled upon in Lindner.154 In both cases,
the same state interest of highway safety was said to have been implicated
by the legislature.155 The lead opinion in Boeckmann deviated from the
analysis in Lindner by finding that because the minors had the lack of good
judgment in consuming alcohol illegally they “may also lack the judgment
to decline to drive after drinking.”156 This deviation is apparent since the
court in Lindner made no attempt to associate prior bad judgment with future actions, basing their decision almost solely on the lack of a vehicle in
the original offense.157
The concurring justices in Boeckmann argue that the lead opinion’s rationale of predicting and punishing future actions based on one’s past
would lead a court reviewing Lindner to the same conclusion as found in
Boeckmann.158 The sex and controlled substance offenders at issue in Lindner, by committing their crimes, have shown a lack of good judgment just
as in Boeckmann; and this lack of judgment could reasonably affect their
ability to drive safely, putting themselves and other motorists at risk.159
Because the issues in the two cases are indistinguishable, if the only state
interest is highway safety, the concurrence chose to overturn Lindner in part
153.
See supra Part IV.A.
154.
See Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1008-12 (Garman, J., concurring) (asserting that
Lindner must at least be overruled in part for the statute at issue to be upheld); See also id. at
1015 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (“Lindner cannot be distinguished in any meaningful way.”).
155.
Id. at 1002 (describing the legitimate state interest as “intended to promote the
safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles.”).
156.
Id. at 1003.
157.
People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ill. 1989).
158.
See Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1011 (Garman, J., concurring).
159.
See id.(objecting to the lead opinions attempt to distinguish the issue at hand
from that found in Lindner: “In essence, the lead opinion concludes that because an individual may commit one crime, he may lack the judgment to decline to commit another crime.
Under this reasoning, the legislature could provide that a conviction for domestic battery is
grounds for the suspension of the offender’s driver’s license because his anger issues make
likely to succumb to road rage . . . . [T]he statute at issue in Lindner would likely survive
this analysis because an individual who would commit acts of sexual assault against his
minor stepdaughters cannot be trusted to resist the temptation to lure a child into his car.”).
Id.
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by finding a different state interest implicated by the legislature.160 With a
different state interest implicated by the statute suspending minors’ driver’s
licenses the justices were able to distinguish Boeckmann from Lindner and
come to a different conclusion as to the constitutionality of the law.161
Without partially overruling Lindner, through finding a different state interest, the concurring justices conceded that the trial court’s decision of the
law being unconstitutional would be upheld.162
The decision in Boeckmann thus rests on the concurring justices’ problematic decision to break from the doctrine of stare decisis and partially
overturn Lindner, which may be seen as good cause to reverse Boeckmann
in the future.163 Stare decisis keeps the court from reexamining decisions on
points of law it has already ruled upon, and then changing the decision absent good cause or unworkable prior decisions.164 There must be more than
the possibility of a different outcome if the question were one of first impression, in other words, a clear mistake must have been made.165 Pinpointing the legitimate state interest that was behind the legislature’s choice to
enact a particular statute is difficult when there is none explicitly stated, and
is by no means an exact science.166 For the concurring justices in Boeckmann to overrule Lindner, stare decisis requires that the court find the legitimate state interest found in Lindner to be a mistake.167 The state interest
in Lindner has been the issue of much judicial scrutiny, and has remained
unchanged throughout the years.168 The decision by only two justices to
label the state interest found in Lindner as clearly a mistake defies the doctrine of stare decisis which serves to “ensure that the law will not merely
change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fash-

160.
Id. at 1015.
161.
Id.
162.
Id. at 1010 (Garman, J., concurring) (“We must either acknowledge that Lindner
was badly reasoned . . . or affirm the trial court . . . .”).
163.
Id. at 1016.
164.
See People v. Colon, 866 N.E.2d 207, 219 (Ill. 2007).
165.
See id.
166.
People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 832-34 (Ill. 1989) (stating the process for
finding the legislative interest implicated by the statute and applying that process to the
facts).
167.
See Colon, 866 N.E.2d at 219.
168.
See, e.g., Lindner, 535 N.E.2d at 835-37 (Miller, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority misrepresented the state interest implicated by the legislature); Illinois v. Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d 998, 1002 (Ill. 2010) (reexamining and using the same state interest as
identified in Lindner); Freed v. Ryan, 704 N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (using the
same state interest as identified in Lindner as a matter of first impression for the statute
dealing with minors); Horvath v. White, 832 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (following
the Horvath opinion as to the state interest).
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ion.”169 In this case, two justices broke away from stare decisis on not what
seems to be a certain mistake made by the court in Lindner, but rather their
opinion of a plausible state interest implicated by the legislature.170 The
concurring justices’ decision to break away from the doctrine of stare decisis itself is not binding precedent as it was only agreed upon by two justices, but their decision to do so brought their holding of the law being constitutional in line with lead opinions.171 If they had not deviated from stare
decisis as the majority of the court had found was inappropriate,172 it is
likely the concurring justices would have sided with the dissenters, based
on their concession that the trial court had ruled correctly by following the
Lindner precedent.173
The decision in Boeckmann divided the court into writing lead, concurring, and dissenting opinions with two justices behind each faction.174
This split shows the complexity of the issue and how the justices can agree
on so much, but in the end come to different conclusions.175 The lead opinion chose not to overrule Lindner in finding the statute constitutional, but
rather contorted the precedent to what the remaining four justices considered “meaningless.”176 The concurring opinion then goes on to find the
same conclusion as the lead, but does so by overruling Lindner without
either party even arguing good cause to do so.177 Finally, the dissent agrees
with the trial court and the concurring justices that by following the precedent laid out in Lindner, this statute must be found unconstitutional.178 The
dissenters, however, agree with the lead opinion that stare decisis prohibits
169.
Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 641 N.E.2d 525, 529 (Ill.
1994).
170.
See Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1008-11 (Garman, J., concurring) (explaining
the justices opinion as to the correct state interest implicated by the legislature).
171.
See id. at 1010-15.
172.
Id. at 1005. The two justices in the lead opinion stated their opposition to deviating from stare decisis: “Lindner should not be overruled without the benefit of a developed
argument by the parties on the issue.” Id. at 1015-16 (Garman, J., concurring). The dissenting justices also noted no reason had been shown to overrule the precedent set forth in Lindner. Id. at 1015 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
173.
See id. at 1011 (conceding that the statute is unconstitutional under the precedent set out in Lindner).
174.
Id. at 1007-16.
175.
See supra notes 167-70.
176.
Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1003-04. The defendant tried to assert that since no
vehicle was used in the crime license suspension was unconstitutional based on Lindner, but
the court stated that “Lindner is broader than simply determining whether a vehicle was
involved in the offense.” Id. at 1016 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (commenting on the concurring justices’ view of the lead opinions reading of Lindner “I agree with her that this analysis
renders Lindner meaningless”).
177.
See id. at 1016 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
178.
See id. (Freeman, J., dissenting).
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the court from overruling Lindner without cause.179 If a case similar to Boeckmann were to be brought up on appeal in the future, a reversal would not
be implausible as so little separated the opinions of the justices who found
the law constitutional from those who found it unconstitutional.180
As previously noted, the best option would be for Illinois to reinstate
license suspension as a punishment for crimes such as delivery of a controlled substance, because this would conform to the Boeckmann decision
which found this punishment does not offend due process for minors who
consume alcohol.181 Conversely, the divisive and troublesome Boeckmann
opinion could be overturned based on the precedent in Lindner that if no
vehicle was involved in the crime, then there can be no rational relationship
between license suspension and highway safety.182
V.

THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND PROPORTIONAL PENALTIES CLAUSES
OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

Along with due process challenges to statutes requiring license suspension for minors, the proportional penalties and double jeopardy clauses
are also commonly at issue.183 Although proportional penalty and double
jeopardy claims are often brought in these cases, none have been successful
in Illinois.184 For either challenge to succeed the same initial question of
“whether suspension of the defendants’ driving privileges is a direct action
by the government to inflict punishment?” must be answered in the affirmative.185 In each case where these claims have been brought, the aforementioned question is where the claims have failed, because traditionally in
Illinois license suspension has been seen “as being remedial and nonpunitive,” therefore it has not been classified as a government action aimed at
inflicting punishment.186
The first case to reach an appellate court in Illinois where a propor179.
See id. (Freeman, J., dissenting).
180.
The concurrence and dissent agreed that the lead opinion left Lindner “meaningless,” and that without overturning Lindner the statute is unconstitutional. The only difference of opinion was whether or not stare decisis requires that Lindner not be overturned. See
supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
181.
See supra Part IV.A.
182.
See People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ill. 1989) (“Because a vehicle was
not involved in any way in the commission of the offenses for which defendant was convicted, the revocation of his license bears no relationship, much less a reasonable one, to the
public interest we have identified.”).
183.
See, e.g., Freed v. Ryan, 704 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
184.
See, e.g., People v. Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d 998, 1007 (Ill. 2010).
185.
Id. at 1007; Freed, 704 N.E.2d at 748 (explaining that the initial question for
both clauses is the same).
186.
People v. Lavariega, 676 N.E.2d 643, 645 (Ill. 1997).
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tional penalty and double jeopardy claim was brought in regards to a minor
using false identification was Freed v. Ryan.187 In Freed v. Ryan, the court
cited Lindner and quickly dismissed the claims because in Lindner it was
determined that “summary suspension of driving privileges before a trial on
the merits is not punishment.”188 Since Freed v. Ryan, cases in Illinois dealing with license suspension for minors using false identification and consumption of alcohol, including most recently Boeckmann, have cited the
proposition from Lindner that summary suspension is not considered punishment without any further inquiry.189 In Lindner, the court cited two cases
in coming to the conclusion that summary suspension is not considered
punishment.190 Both of these cases deal with summary suspension after the
arrest of an adult for driving while under the influence of alcohol.191 Each
of the cases cited in Lindner found summary suspension not to be considered punishment also by citing prior driving while under the influence cases
that involve adult offenders.192 Common sense dictates that the legislature
had protection of the public in mind, not punishment, when dealing with
summary license suspension for people suspected of driving while under
the influence of alcohol.193 These offenders have committed an offense with
a vehicle on a public roadway that puts the safety of themselves and others
in danger, and thereby relates to highway safety.194 On the other hand, the
minor offenders have committed no crime that involves a vehicle or has put
those on roadways in danger, therefore the relation to highway safety or the
remedial and non-punitive purpose is unfounded.195 This lacking relationship should be enough for a court in Illinois to at least entertain a discussion
on the initial question for dealing with proportional penalty and double

187.
See Freed, 704 N.E.2d at 748.
188.
Id.
189.
See Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1007.
190.
People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ill. 1989) (citing Illinois v. Esposito,
521 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ill. 1988); Koss v. Slater, 507 N.E.2d 826, 829 (Ill. 1987)).
191.
See Esposito, 521 N.E.2d at 875; Koss, 507 N.E.2d at 826.
192.
See Esposito, 521 N.E.2d at 877 (citing People v. Adams, 471 N.E.2d 575, 577
(Ill. 1984)); Koss, 507 N.E.2d at 829 (citing People v. Shaffer, 481 N.E.2d 61, 62 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985)).
193.
See Esposito, 521 N.E.2d at 877 (“[T]he statutory summary suspension procedure [was] intended to protect the public, not to punish the licensee.”).
194.
See id.
195.
See Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1010-11 (Garman, J., concurring). When describing the offense committed by the defendants, Justice Garman wrote:
[It] is not tied to an offense involving the use of a vehicle, or that individuals who commit this have not demonstrated that they are unfit to
safely operate a vehicle, or that such persons have not threatened the
safety of others or abused the privilege of driving by doing so illegally.
Id.
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jeopardy claims instead of just citing Lindner and writing it off.196
Persuasive authority from other states also suggests that courts in Illinois need to more thoroughly analyze whether license suspension for minors who violate alcohol related statutes with no vehicle involvement
should be considered punishment.197 Alaska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Wyoming have all held that statutes suspending the licenses of minors for
alcohol related offenses not involving vehicles are considered punishment.198 While the courts in Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming assume
suspension is punishment and immediately move onto the next steps of the
analysis,199 the court in Alaska discusses why license suspension in these
situations should be considered punishment.200 The court focuses on the
loose connection between the minor’s offense and its relation to highway
safety.201 The court admits these teens may be included in some statistical
class of more dangerous drivers, but states that their offense “does not necessarily, or even probably, reflect on the arrested minor’s fitness to
drive.”202 With the conduct being so far removed from the remedial purpose
of highway safety, the court concludes that punishment is the true purpose
behind the law.203 These cases address statutes that are very similar to the
law at issue in Boeckmann; so much so that the cases out of Alaska and
Pennsylvania are cited as persuasive authority in the lead opinion justices’
decision to uphold the law on due process grounds.204 Although these two
cases go into the analysis of whether suspension is considered punishment
and find that it is, the court in Boeckmann then fails to address these cases
in its shorthanded discussion, which classifies license suspension as nonpunitive.205
Another tool that can be helpful in determining whether license suspension for these minor offenders was intended to be punishment is to look
through the legislative history of the statute.206 The transcripts from the
196.
See id.
197.
See supra Part II.C.
198.
See supra note 46.
199.
See State v. Day, 733 P.2d 937, 939 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); Commonwealth v.
Strunk, 582 A.2d 1326, 1330-32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Johnson v. Hearing Exam’rs Office,
838 P.2d 158, 177-80 (Wyo. 1992).
200.
See State v. Neidermeyer, 14 P.3d 264, 268-72 (Ala. 2000).
201.
See id. at 270 (“[T]his roundabout connection is not the direct and necessary
link that must exist before an administrative revocation will be considered non-punitive.”).
202.
Id.
203.
Id. at 271 (“[T]he statute imposes a harsh, mandatory penalty for misconduct
that has no necessary or close relation to bad driving, its sanction will naturally be seen not
as a remedial measure addressing traffic safety, but as punishment . . . .”).
204.
See People v. Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (Ill. 2010).
205.
See id. at 1007.
206.
See id. at 1013-14 (Garman, J., concurring).
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Illinois State Senate on this statute show little discourse, with Senator
Holmes having the only comments, concluding with “[b]asically, this bill
just strengthens the fight on underage drinking.”207 In the Illinois House of
Representatives there was more discussion on the bill, but there is no clear
evidence of whether punishment or highway safety was intended as the
purpose.208 Nonetheless, the discussion in the House of Representatives
may be important if a court in the future is dealing with this question of
whether punishment was the goal of the state.209 In the Boeckmann concurrence, the court makes a faulty assumption that would lead a reader to believe that Representative Tom Cross was implying that the statute would
lead to less drunken driving by teens.210 The court cites a portion of the
transcript from the House of Representatives where the legislator is speaking about a car crash that killed five teens.211 The concurring justice assumes that the Representative was implying a person under the age of
twenty-one was driving the vehicle who would have had their license suspended if this statute had been in place.212 This was not the case though; the
driver of the one vehicle accident, of which the five teens were passengers,
was a twenty-three-year-old woman who was driving under the influence of
alcohol.213 Thus, the assumption made by the court in Boeckmann should
not be used in the future when analyzing whether this statute implicated

207.
State of Illinois, Senate Transcript, 95th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess., May 5, 2007, at
29-30, available at http://ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans95/09500042.pdf.
208.
See State of Illinois, House Transcript, 95th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess., April 27,
2007, at 22-28, available at http://ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans95/09500044.pdf.
209.
See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
210.
See Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1014 (Garman, J., concurring).
211.
Id. at 1013. Representative Cross stated:
This is a bill that deals with drinking by teenagers, specifically minors.
As we all know, the law says if your under 21 you cannot drink in the
State of Illinois. This bill provides that in the event of a court supervision, which I think is a good concept . . . that you would lose your
driver’s license for a period of three (3) months. That has not been the
case when someone receives court supervision. We had a rather tragic
incident in Oswego, a couple of months ago, where five (5) young children lost their lives. Alcohol was involved. This is an attempt to address
that issue and it has unfortunately been a problem around the state.
State of Illinois, House Transcript, 95th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess., April 27, 2007, at 21-22,
available at http://ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans95/09500044.pdf)
212.
Boeckmann, 932 N.E.2d at 1013 (Garman, J., concurring) (“Representative
Cross did not specifically state that the driver who caused the accident was a teenager who
was then under court supervision for a violation of section 6-20 of the Liquor Control Act,
although this fact seems to be implied by his remarks.”).
213.
Illinois Woman Sentenced to Fifteen Years in DUI Crash, DUILAWYER.COM,
http://www.duiattorney.com/news/7367-illinois-woman-sentenced-to-fifteen-years-in-duicrash (last visited January 7, 2010).
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punishment or a remedial purpose.214 Although, no clear purpose is found
through the legislative history the statement in the Senate claiming the bill
“strengthens the fight on underage drinking” would seem to implicate punishment and not highway safety.215
For the reasons stated above, the Supreme Court of Illinois should
more prudently analyze whether the purpose behind license suspension for
these minor offenders is rooted in highway safety or punishment.216 The
court’s prior decisions on the issue gloss over the question, citing precedent
that deals with offenses committed while in a vehicle, and are therefore not
analogous.217 Also, courts in a number of other states have come to the conclusion that license suspension in these situations should be considered punitive, as the remedial purpose, if at all evident, is too far removed from the
offense.218 Finally, the court has misinterpreted the legislative history of the
statute, which also may have played a role in the decision to find a remedial
purpose.219 Once the court gets past this initial question that has led to the
wrongful dismissal of so many claims, it can further analyze whether these
statutes are in violation of the Double Jeopardy or the Proportional Penalties Clauses of the Illinois Constitution.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The court system of Illinois has misapplied substantive due process
analysis when statutes requiring license suspension or revocation for crimes
not involving vehicles have been at issue.220 This misapplication has also
led the courts to not properly analyze proportional penalties and double
jeopardy claims when brought by minors.221 The result of the due process
analysis error can be found in the contradictory holdings that license revocation for certain controlled substance and sex offenses is unconstitutional,
while suspending the licenses of minors convicted of possessing fraudulent
identification or consuming alcohol has been held constitutional.222 The
ideal resolution to this contradiction would be for the judiciary to reverse its
decision that license revocation for sex and controlled substance offenders
violates due process.223 On the other hand, if the court will not reverse its
214.
See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
215.
See State of Illinois, Senate Transcript, 95th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess., May 5, 2007,
at 29-30, available at http://ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans95/09500042.pdf.
216.
See supra Part V.A.
217.
See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
218.
See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
219.
See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
220.
See supra Part IV.A.
221.
See supra Part V.
222.
See supra notes 1-2.
223.
See supra Part IV.A.
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decision in regards to the sex and controlled substance offenses, it should
follow precedent and find the law suspending minors’ driver’s licenses unconstitutional.224 Either option would better serve the citizens of Illinois as
the injustice of an unequal application of the due process of law would be
ended.
With the Illinois Supreme Court currently holding that license suspension for minors to be constitutional, offenders have frequently challenged
the law through the Double Jeopardy and the Proportionate Penalties
Clauses.225 The court has also erred in dismissing these claims without ever
properly inquiring as to whether license suspension for these minors should
be considered punishment.226 Looking to the future, the courts of Illinois
need to provide a more equal standard of due process review when dealing
with statutes that suspend or revoke a driver’s license when no vehicle is
involved in the crime. The court should also provide a more probing inquiry
into the purposes behind the decision to suspend the licenses of minors
convicted of alcohol related offenses. These steps will help provide the citizens of Illinois with the appropriate protections established in the State’s
Constitution.
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